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ON LAWYERS AND MORAL
DISCERNMENT
ROBERT E. RODES, JR.t
Lawyers make their living by interfering in other people's
affairs. If they are to lead moral lives, they must exercise moral
discernment regarding those affairs as well as regarding their
own. Rule 2.1 of the American Bar Association's Model Rules of
Professional Conduct says: "In rendering advice a lawyer may
refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral,
economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the
client's situation."' People who come to lawyers for advice are
apt to be, to a greater or less extent, traumatized. They are very
apt, in the unfamiliar situation they are encountering, to do
whatever their lawyer says. The lawyer, therefore, has a serious
responsibility not to tell them to do anything wrong.
Not only must lawyers refrain from advising their clients to
do anything wrong; they must also refrain from helping their
clients do anything wrong that they think up for themselves.
Lawyers' moral discernment must extend not only to their
clients' agendas but also to how far their service to their clients
makes them complicit in whatever wrong the clients do. There
are various ways of addressing the question of complicity; all of
them call for moral discernment regarding the lawyer's role
distinct from moral discernment regarding the client's agenda.
Lawyers' moral discernment, whether regarding their
clients' actions or their own, is commonly exercised in dialogue.
An agenda for a representation is not formed by a lawyer laying
moral pronouncements-or, worse, guilt trips-on a client on a
take it or leave it basis. The case may well be one where the
client's moral discernment is better than the lawyer's, and the
two of them, when they have reflected on it together, may well
come up with a better moral discernment than either had at the
t PAUL J. Schierl/Fort Howard Corporation Professor of Legal Ethics, Notre
Dame Law School, Notre Dame, Indiana.
I MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2007).
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outset. A common agenda calls for a common discernment, and a
common discernment is achieved through dialogue.
Other forms of dialogue are called for when a lawyer is
dealing with other parties to a transaction or with opposing
parties to a litigation. It is possible, I suppose, to negotiate a
transaction or settle a case through sheer power and the threat of
its exercise, but it is more agreeable all around to put on the
table the question of what is fair and try to arrive at a common
discernment. Advocacy also calls for moral dialogue. Dura lex
sed lex will sometimes, perhaps, sway a court by itself, but one
will make a more effective argument if one can lead a court or
jury to a moral discernment in accordance with the claim one is
presenting.
In legislation also, there is moral discernment arrived at
through dialogue. There is, of course, no one-to-one
correspondence between law and morality, nor should there be.
We cannot effectively make people do good and avoid evil through
the force of the enacted law, but we certainly do not want to
deploy that force in favor of having them do evil and avoid good.
Whatever else we put into the law, we try to make laws that
encourage people to do as they ought, and we do our best not to
make ones that encourage them to do as they ought not.
Therefore, in the legislative process, there is a lot of discussion of
the rights and wrongs of particular cases to which the proposed
law may apply, and a reaching for a common moral discernment
on which a majority can vote.
By using the term "moral discernment," I am making a claim
that not everyone will accept. The claim is that the concepts of
Right and Wrong are objective qualities that may be predicated
of particular human acts in the same way that Green and Blue
are objective qualities that may be predicated of particular
neckties. 2 The most common objection to this claim is that the
rightness or wrongness of an act cannot be empirically verified,
but when you come right down to it, neither can the greenness or
blueness of a necktie. That is, just as there is no criterion of
2 Right and Wrong, as I am using the terms, are necessary but not sufficient
guides for choice. By Right I mean within the range of morally acceptable options,
and by Wrong I mean outside that range. Complete theories of right action require
more subtle definitions. See Michael Slote, Right Action, in THE OXFORD COMPANION
TO PHILOSOPHY 818, 818-19 (Ted Honderich ed., 2d ed. 2005) [hereinafter OXFORD
COMPANION].
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rightness that you can apply to an act, so there is no criterion of
blueness that you can apply to a necktie. You compare the
necktie with other objects you know are blue, and you compare
the act with other actions you know are right.
Obviously the discernment of right and wrong cuts deeper
than the discernment of blue and green. When I was a child,
everybody around me agreed on what things were blue and what
things were green. I very soon found myself making judgments
of color in full accord with theirs, and I have never had occasion
to question any of their judgments since I have grown up.
Naturally, I cannot say the same about judgments of right and
wrong, but the fact that there is disagreement on moral
questions does not prove that those questions have no right
answers. Some moral questions are hard. Some require more
reflection than most people have the time or the ability to deploy.
The same is true of other questions to which nobody doubts there
are right answers. Take the question of whether a certain pill
cures the disease for which it is prescribed, causes heart attacks,
or both. There will be a spate of empirical studies before even
the experts claim to know. Or take the question of whether two
notes are in harmony. Play the two together, and some people
will tell you immediately. I will not have a clue.
A number of eighteenth century British philosophers,
notably David Hume 3 and Adam Smith,4 concluded that people
have a moral sense that is the ultimate arbiter of questions of
right and wrong. Hume put it this way:
The final sentence, it is probable, which pronounces characters
and actions amiable or odious, praise-worthy or blameable; that
which stamps on them the mark of honour or infamy,
approbation or censure; that which renders morality an active
principle, and constitutes virtue our happiness, and vice our
misery: It is probable, I say, that this final sentence depends on
some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made
universal in the whole species. 5
3 See DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 5
(Tom L. Beauchamp ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1998) (1777).
4 See ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 128 (Knut Haakonsen
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2002) (1759).
5 HUME, supra note 3, at 5.
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Edmond Cahn in the 1950s 6 and James Wilson in the 1990s 7
have argued for a similar sense. This sense seems very similar to
what Jacques Maritain calls "knowledge through connaturality."
Through this concept, Maritain relates the immediate
discernment of right and wrong to Natural Law-which, as he
describes it, does not seem too different from Hume's internal
sense or feeling which nature has made universal in the whole
species:
My contention is that the judgments in which Natural Law is
made manifest to practical Reason do not proceed from any
conceptual, discursive, rational exercise of reason; they proceed
from that connaturality or congeniality through which what is
consonant with the essential inclinations of human nature is
grasped by the intellect as good; what is dissonant, as bad. 9
Cahn and Wilson are both chary of resting moral judgments
on discursive reasoning. 10 Hume and Maritain both assign such
reasoning a definite, albeit subordinate, place-quite similar
places, although not exactly the same. After the passage just
quoted, Hume says:
[I]n order to pave the way for such a sentiment, and give a
proper discernment of its object, it is often necessary, we find,
that much reasoning should precede, that nice distinctions be
made, just conclusions drawn, distant comparisons formed,
complicated relations examined, and general facts fixed and
ascertained. 11
He draws an analogy from a classical appreciation of the arts:
[I]n many orders of beauty, particularly those of the finer arts,
it is requisite to employ much reasoning, in order to feel the
proper sentiment; and a false relish may frequently be corrected
by argument and reflection. There are just grounds to conclude,
that moral beauty partakes much of this latter species, and
demands the assistance of our intellectual faculties, in order to
give it a suitable influence on the human mind. 12
6 See generally EDMOND N. CAHN, THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE: AN
ANTHROPOCENTRIC VIEW OF LAW (1949).
7 See generally JAMES Q. WILSON, THE MORAL SENSE (1993).
8 JACQUES MARITAIN, On Knowledge Through Connaturality, in THE RANGE OF
REASON 22, 22 (1952).
9 Id. at 27.
10 See CAHN, supra note 6, at 4-14; WILSON, supra note 7, at 1-26.
11 HUME, supra note 3, at 5.
12 Id. at 5-6.
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Compare this with what Maritain says:
Moral philosophy has critically to analyze and rationally to
elucidate moral standards and rules of conduct whose validity
was previously discovered in an undemonstrable manner, and
in a non-conceptual, non-rational way; it has also to clear them,
as far as possible, from the adventitious outgrowths or
deviations which may have developed by reason of the
coarseness of our nature and the accidents of social evolution.13
In his book On the Philosophy of History, Maritain points to
a growth through time in people's moral discernments, with a
corresponding growth in moral philosophy. 14 He attributes that
growth to "moral experience." 15 I gather the idea is that when we
see what we do to ourselves and other people there are some
things we realize we should not have done, and these realizations
enter into how we behave in the future and what we teach our
children. This moral philosophy, which Maritain calls "a kind of
after-knowledge," 16 formulates what we have learned, and new
principles develop. Maritain refers to views on slavery,
polygamy, the employment relation, and the treatment of
prisoners of war as examples of moral development. 17 We can
point to gender equality and concern for the environment as
examples of considerable growth since the time in which he
wrote.
The development of moral discernment through dialogue is
analogous on a smaller scale to the development of moral
philosophy through experience. Examples are everywhere. Here
are three, taken more or less at random from the legal literature
or from lawyers' experience:
(1) A criminal defendant has the right to be present in court
when a judge is passing sentence on him. He is entitled to evoke
an empathetic awareness (Adam Smith would call it sympathy)
in the person who is disposing of his life. For the same reason, a
personal injury lawyer should be careful to keep an injured
plaintiff in the sight of the jury.
13 MARITAIN, supra note 8, at 28.
14 See JACQUES MARITAIN, ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 104-11 (Joseph W.
Evans ed., 1957).
15 Id. at 109.
16 Id.
17 See id. at 105-07.
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(2) In a book by Thomas Shaffer and Robert Cochran, there
is a story of a young couple who come to a lawyer to get
the lawyer to stop the conversion of a large house in their
neighborhood into a home for mildly retarded adult men. The
lawyer takes her clients to visit the men and see if that reassures
them. What she is doing is adding factual information-as well
as empathy-to the clients' moral scrutiny of the situation.18
According to Hume, this is one of the ways that reason informs
the moral sense.
(3) An employer comes to a law firm for advice about a
discontinued industrial process that has turned out to be
carcinogenic. The lawyers find that the cancer took so long to
develop that the period of limitations under the state's
Occupational Diseases Act had expired before any of the client's
employees or former employees got sick. But, the lawyers
suggest that since workers are suffering from a disease
contracted in the employer's service, the employer may want to
do something for them. The officers of the employer agree, and
set up a plan of monitoring and treatment. Here, the lawyers
point the way to a moral discernment that the officers might
have made for themselves if their attention had not been fixed on
something else. What the lawyers do is comparable to pointing
out an object that another person has not noticed. Say that I see
a hawk in the sky, point at it, and say, "Look, there's a hawk up
there." The person with me looks up and says, "So there is."
There are various ethical theories on the market. They are
often useful to guide discernment, but none of them is a
substitute for the discernment itself; that is, there is no criterion
that one can simply apply to all proposed actions, and so decide
whether they are right or wrong. Any such criterion would either
have intuitively discerned limitations or exceptions, or would
require intuitive discernment to apply. Take, for instance, the
Golden Rule: Do to others as you would have them do to you.
This is an important call to empathetic discernment, but it
cannot always be literally applied. It is all very well for me to
tell my grandson he should not push his sister down because he
would not want her to push him down. But, it becomes more
complicated if I want to stop somebody from reading a certain
18 See THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND
MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 116-29 (1994).
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book because it is a bad book and I would want someone to stop
me if I started to read it.19 Also, I have a fairly thick skin: I am
capable of blundering into doing things that mortally offend
other people, but which would not in the least have offended me.
The Golden Rule would not help me to discern what those things
are.
The Principle of Universalizability is another useful guide
for moral discernment, but not a substitute for it. The Principle
asserts that to act morally is to act in ways that we would be
content to have everyone act under the same circumstances.
When I was a child, I stole a small pulley out of a bin of such
pulleys in a Sears Roebuck store. My father told me to think
about what would happen if everybody stole one. I had never
thought about that before, and was duly contrite when I did.
That was the Principle of Universalizability at work.
I have used the same principle in teaching Legal Ethics.
One of the greats in this subject, Monroe Freedman, argues that
a lawyer should be morally accountable for what cases he chooses
to take, but not for what he does, as long as it is within the law,
to further that case once he has taken it:
The lawyer's decision to accept or to reject a client is a moral
decision for which the lawyer can properly be held morally
accountable.... One of the most important considerations in
deciding to accept or reject a client is that the lawyer, in
representing the client, might be required to use tactics that the
lawyer finds offensive.20
Given the Principle of Universalizability, I take the exact
opposite view. There are all kinds of reasons for turning down a
case, but you cannot turn it down on moral grounds unless you
would be content if no lawyer took it. On the other hand, there
are forensic tactics that may be quite effective, but I would be
content if nobody used them. Therefore, it is morally acceptable
not to use them.21
19 See, e.g., Robert E. Rodes, Jr., Limits of Law, 48 REV. POL. 481, 481-83 (1986)
(reviewing 2 JOEL FEINBERG, OFFENSE TO OTHERS: THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW (1985)).
20 MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHIcS 74
(3d ed. 2004). "When Freedman was doing criminal defense work, he stopped taking
rape cases because he did not want to be in the position of cross-examining the
victim." Id. at 222.
21 Bringing up irrelevant sexual irregularities on the part of rape victims is the
example most commonly dealt with in the literature, but there are others. In 1921,
2007]
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Either way, however, the Principle of Universalizability will
not tell me which clients to take or what tactics to use. That
requires moral discernment. The Principle does no more than
keep me from escaping the necessity for such discernment on the
ground that it is somebody else's problem.
For some religionists, divine command is an adequate source
of morality. I had a student of this persuasion once in a
Jurisprudence class (she graduated from law school at the head
of her class). She insisted that all morality could be found in the
Bible. Her views on moral questions were always tenable and
always supported by Scriptural texts. They were not much
different from the views of any strong Evangelical Christian,
even one without her command of proof texts. For neither she,
nor I, nor anyone else comes to the Scripture with a mind or a
heart empty of moral discernment. Our religious commitments
affect our moral discernment in many important ways, but they
are not written on a clean slate and their application often
requires a discerning heart.22 I believe moral theology, like
moral philosophy, is apt to be an after-knowledge.
Consequentialism, the view that the rightness or wrongness
of an action depends on whether its effects will be overall good or
bad,23 is perhaps less a theory than an attitude. "You can't make
an omelet without breaking eggs" is not exactly a principle of
philosophy, but many moral arguments are based on it. Such
arguments are often persuasive. There is a film about the staff
preparations for the Normandy landings in June 1944, in which
the generals agonize over whether to send parachutists to almost
certain destruction in order to take out the guns that would
otherwise inflict far heavier losses on the troops at the
beachheads. This kind of discernment is generally conceded to be
necessary in wartime, but when it is used to justify an economic
system in which some people are left miserable so that the rest
may prosper, we become skeptical of it. Similarly, when it is
used to justify torture, most people, myself included, reject it. In
short, we recognize that good results are generally better than
Hugo Black, the future Supreme Court Justice, defending a Klansman who had shot
and killed a Catholic priest, used flagrant appeals to the racial and religious
prejudices of the jury. See ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY 71-88 (2d
ed. 1997).
22 This is what Solomon asks for in 1 Kings 3:9 (New International).
23 See Brad Hooker, Consequentialism, in OXFORD COMPANION, supra note 2, at
162, 162.
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bad ones, but they cannot justify actions that our immediate
discernment calls wrong.
Utilitarianism is a particular form of consequentialism
erected into a system by Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832),24 and
espoused by a number of eminent thinkers since. It approves an
act insofar as it causes pleasure or prevents pain and
disapproves of it insofar as it causes pain or prevents pleasure.
Its analyses are sometimes useful. For instance, it would
support the graduated income tax by pointing out that a person
gets less pleasure out of his second million dollars than his
first.25  But as a sufficient criterion for moral judgments,
Utilitarianism will not do. In the first place, pains and pleasures
cannot be definitively quantified against one another. If I am
watching a bad movie in good company, does the pleasure of the
company outweigh the pain of the movie? Is the whole
experience more or less pleasurable than watching a good movie
by myself? If a client comes in with a heartrending story, does
the pleasure I take in anticipating a solution to her problem
outweigh my pain in hearing about it? How does the pleasure six
people take in watching one television program compare with the
pleasure eighteen people take in watching another?
Even if pleasures and pains could all be quantified, the most
serious objection to Utilitarianism would remain: That is that
some pleasures are better than others. If A gets a certain
quantum of pleasure out of listening to a symphony, and B gets
the same quantum out of playing a video game in which he
pretends to be a serial killer, it is not hard to think of A's
pleasure as morally superior to B's. It follows that our moral
discernment is not reducible to a quantitative measurement of
pleasures and pains. Furthermore; some acts are generally
regarded as immoral even if the pleasures they cause are far in
excess of the pains. In Edinburgh in the early nineteenth
century, a man named William Burke made part of his living by
murdering tramps and selling their bodies to the local medical
school for dissection. 26 Let us assume that he dispatched his
24 See generally JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF
MORALS AND LEGISLATION (Clarendon Press 2d ed. 1907) (1789).
25 See JEREMY BENTHAM, First Lines of a Proposed Code of Law for Any Nation
Compleat and Rationalized, in 'LEGISLATOR OF THE WORLD': WRITINGS ON
CODIFICATION, LAW, AND EDUCATION 187, 199-200 (Philip Schofield & Jonathan
Harris eds., 1998).
26 See L. Perry Curtis, Jr., Burke, William, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 796,
20071
JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES [Vol. 46:259
victims quickly and painlessly before they realized what he was
doing, that they had been leading miserable lives, and that
nobody missed them. On that assumption, there would be no
significant pain to set against the pleasure to Burke from having
money to spend, to the medical students from learning their
profession, and to their future patients from being restored to
health by the students' ministrations. Nevertheless, I believe
most people would agree with me in stigmatizing Burke as a
murderer (he was hanged). Our moral discernment disregards
our measurement of pleasures and pains, and condemns the
unprovoked murder out of hand.
Of course it could be argued that the pain to the general
public from murders being committed with impunity outweighs
the pleasure experienced in the sale and use of the cadavers.
Fair enough, but the pain caused to us by the murder seems to be
a product of our discernment that the murder was wrong. Again,
then, the moral discernment is prior to the quantitative
measurement of pains and pleasures. If the contemplation of
good deeds causes us pleasure and the contemplation of evil
deeds causes us pain, we cannot define good and evil in terms of
pleasures and pains or the whole project will become circular.
People seem to like to form moral judgments on one or
another of these theories rather than on connatural intuitive
discernment because the theories give an illusion of objectivity.
The author of the article on Utilitarianism in The Oxford
Companion to Philosophy concludes by saying:
The great strength of utilitarianism as an ethical theory lies in
its ability to replace the hodgepodge (and, arguably,
inconsistency) of our common-sense moral intuitions with a
unified system of thought that treats all moral questions in
uniform fashion and in relation to an ideal, human happiness or
desire satisfaction, that is both less obscure and more attractive
than most alternatives. 27
And Bentham himself excoriates what he calls "the principle
of sympathy and antipathy,"28 presumably meaning Adam
28 BENTHAM, supra note 24, at 13-21.
796 (Int'l ed. 1994).
27 Michael Slote, Utilitarianism, in OXFORD COMPANION, supra note 2, at 890-
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Smith's doctrine, 29 as "rather a principle in name than in
reality."30
What one expects to find in a principle is something that points
out some external consideration, as a means of warranting and
guiding the internal sentiments of approbation and
disapprobation: this expectation is but ill fulfilled by a
proposition, which does neither more nor less than hold up each
of those sentiments as a ground and standard for itself.31
But it is of the essence of moral discernment-or of any other
kind of discernment for that matter-that it does not depend on
the application of any "external consideration." Let us go back to
the necktie. When I look at it and decide it is green, I do not
have any external consideration as a means of warranting and
guiding my internal sentiment of green or blue. I just look at it
and say what color I think it is.
Of course judgments as to color are different from moral
judgments in that no one is apt to disagree with them, and except
in a few cases like traffic lights, it would not matter if they did.
Moral judgments, on the other hand, often differ greatly, and
may cause acrimony or even open warfare when they do. That is
true enough, but it does not change the nature of moral
discernment. There is an old joke about a man who is seen one
night searching the sidewalk at a street corner. He explains to a
passerby that he lost his wallet in the middle of the block, but is
looking for it on the corner because there is more light. His
reasoning seems to be like that in the quoted passage from The
Oxford Companion to Philosophy. I submit that you cannot tell
right from wrong without using common-sense intuitions, and if
those intuitions are a hodgepodge, you have a problem that you
cannot solve by giving up on them. I believe both Maritain and
Hume, in the language I have quoted, point the way to a use of
reason to sort out the hodgepodge or keep it from occurring.
Moral philosophy to a great extent and moral theology to a
greater extent have tended to come up with "exceptionless" moral
rules. That is, rules to the effect that it is always wrong to
commit adultery, to commit suicide, to kill innocent people, or
whatever. If these rules are all a matter of after-knowledge, if
they result from reflection on a series of individual discernments,
29 See SMITH, supra note 4, at 11-20.
30 BENTHAM, supra note 24, at 16.
31 Id.
2007] 269
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how can we be sure that they will be applicable in every occasion
for discernment that may ever arise? This question can be made
particularly difficult by constructing hypotheticals. A madman
has an atomic bomb that he will set off unless you shoot your
grandmother. An evil emperor will invade and destroy your
country unless you leave your husband and marry him.
Let me try to answer with this analogy. When I was about
ten years old, I stuck my finger in a light socket. The result was
an interesting noise and an unpleasant tingle in my hand. I
thought that if I put something other than my finger into the
socket, I could hear the interesting noise and avoid the
unpleasant sensation. The object I chose was a metal cap pistol.
Bad move. It blew a fuse and plunged the whole house into
darkness. Reflecting on this experience (with some aid from
the experience of previous generations) I arrived at the
exceptionless rule, "Don't put metal objects into light sockets."
Of course it is the unchanging nature of electricity that
enabled me to derive from this one incident a principle good for
all times and places. By the same token, it is the claim that
there is an unchanging human nature that supports the claim
that exceptionless rules can be derived from the experience of
moral discernment in individual cases. Maritain refers to such
experience as "the judgments in which Natural Law is made
manifest to Practical Reason."3 2 The moral discernment in a
particular case is based on an intuitive awareness of human
nature and what human nature requires-Maritain's knowledge
through connaturality, and Hume's internal sense or feeling
which Nature has made universal in the whole species. The
horrible hypotheticals, then, are simply invitations to give the
last word in a particular situation to forces that we recognize as
inimical to our nature. It is easier to turn the invitation down in
a hypothetical case than in a real one, but in either case it should
be turned down.
Your faculty for moral discernment is called your conscience.
It is your duty to form it by study and reflection if necessary, and
once it is formed, to follow it. The duty stated in this way raises
the Problem of the Erring Conscience. If, as I have argued, the
rightness or wrongness of a particular act is a matter of objective
reality like the color of a necktie, and if, as is obvious from
32 MARITAIN, supra note 8, at 27.
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everyday experience, it is possible to be mistaken about whether
a particular act is right or wrong, then there is a paradox in the
offing. It is my duty to do X because, having formed my
conscience as best I can, I believe in conscience that X is the right
thing to do. On the other hand, it is my duty not to do X because
X is in fact wrong.
Actually, however, the paradox will be spurious. Doing what
I erroneously suppose to be right because I want to do right is no
more paradoxical than taking what I erroneously suppose to be
the road to Detroit because I want to go to Detroit. Nobody will
blame me (except perhaps for my stupidity) for taking the wrong
road, but I still will not get to Detroit. Similarly, nobody will (or
nobody ought to) blame me for doing what my conscience told me
was right, but it still was not the right thing to do. To be sure,
insofar as the requirements of morality are requirements of our
nature, falling short of them may have bad consequences in spite
of my good faith-just as my good faith will not get me to Detroit
if I take the wrong road.
At this point, we come to a special problem for lawyers. Our
job, as I say, is to interfere in other people's affairs. Those people
have consciences, often consciences as carefully formed as our
own, and yet that may differ from ours. If they are bound to
follow their consciences and we to follow ours, how are we to
reach an agenda for the representation with which lawyer and
client are both comfortable? More problematic still, if we are in
agreement when the representation starts, but something comes
up in the middle on which our consciences differ, what are we to
do?
The first thing to note about situations like this is that they
are not as frequent as is often supposed. The typical case in
which the client's agenda runs afoul of the lawyer's conscience is
not one where good faith and serious reflection have resulted in
differing moral discernments. It is one in which the client gets
carried away by an unaccustomed forensic environment,
and wants the lawyer to do something that any objective
discernment outside the courthouse would find immoral, or else
it is one in which the lawyer's own conscience is carried away by
the duty of "zealous representation" to permit what a thoughtful
client, as well as a neutral observer, would regard as a dirty
trick.
2007]
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Monroe Freedman, whose take in these matters is
unfailingly thoughtful and decent, although here in my opinion
quite wrong, resolves all these problems by subordinating his
own moral discernment to the client's autonomy.33 Or perhaps I
should say he discerns a duty on his part to respect the client's
autonomy, a duty which is more important than his discernment
of what the client should do. He is very careful to share his
discernment with the client, but once he has accepted the
representation, he considers himself bound to implement
the client's choices: "Accordingly, the attorney acts both
professionally and morally in assisting clients to maximize their
autonomy, that is, by counseling clients candidly and fully
regarding the clients' legal rights and moral responsibilities as
the lawyer perceives them, and by assisting clients to carry out
their lawful decisions." 34
He uses as an example a case where Lawyer A, after a hard
negotiating session, receives a draft contract for his client's
signature in which Lawyer B for the other party has
inadvertently left in place a provision favorable to A's client that
A had reluctantly agreed to take out. The question is whether A
should inform B of the mistake and let B correct the draft.
Freedman argues that respect for client autonomy requires
presenting that question to the client-accompanied no doubt by
suitable moral advice-and following the client's decision
whichever way it goes. 35
For my part, I would be insulted if my lawyer put a question
like that to me, and I would be very hesitant to employ a lawyer
who would be willing to leave the provision alone if the client
said to do so. But, the main thing to notice about this case is that
it is not one of differing moral discernment. I cannot believe that
the client thinks it is morally right not to correct the other
party's inadvertence. What Freedman discerns to be his moral
duty as a lawyer is to allow the client's autonomy to trump the
client's moral duty as a human being. I strongly disagree.
I believe my disagreement with Freedman, unlike the
question just considered, represents a genuine difference of moral
discernment. After we have both reflected carefully on the case,
he sees the lawyer's duty one way, and I see it another. But since
33 See FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 20, at 46-69.
34 Id. at 62.
35 See id. at 54.
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we are both professors, our difference is, in the most literal sense,
academic.
Sometimes practical cases do occur in which lawyer and
client, both following carefully formed consciences, differ on a
moral question that concerns them both. Such cases tend to
involve domestic relations or civil rights. The client believes he
would be the best person to have custody of his children; the
lawyer believes the other parent would be better. The client
believes it would be wrong to rent an apartment to an unmarried
cohabitating couple; the lawyer believes it would be wrong to
discriminate against such a couple.
Whatever the source of the disagreement, I suggest the
following rules for handling it. The first rule is to treat the
difference with respect. The client comes to the lawyer needing
help. The relation between them is necessarily one of trust and
confidence. Any lack of respect betrays it. There is a story from
a 1963 casebook that has been called "the most famous case in
legal counseling."36 A woman comes to a lawyer to divorce her
husband and marry her lover. The lawyer decides she is "an
amoral, spoiled brat," and tells her she needs a good
horsewhipping. He may be right, but that is no way to treat a
client.
At the same time, it is important to be clear and steadfast in
setting forth one's own moral discernment regarding the matter
in hand. Questions of right and wrong have right answers,
however hard those answers may be to arrive at in particular
cases. When a common moral discernment is required for a
common agenda, the best way to reach one is for people to put
their own discernment on the table, along with whatever of their
reasoning they can articulate, and then listen carefully to each
other. If this is done with sufficient respect, it may lead to a
common conscience, or, if that is impossible, at least to an
amicable parting.
If, after sifting the matter with a client, the lawyer is in
doubt as to what is the right thing to do, I think it is appropriate
to resolve the doubt in favor of the client's discernment or the
client's interest. There is a traditional moral doctrine called
Probabilism according to which an act may be safely done if there
36 See THOMAS L. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LEGAL ETHICS: TEXT, READINGS, AND
DISCUSSION Topics 460-62 (1985).
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is a reasonable probability that it is morally acceptable.37 The
nuances of the doctrine were developed in the confessional, where
it was too late to decide not to do the act in question. Even so, it
gives some support to the idea that one can defer to another's
discernment if one is not sure it is wrong.
On the other hand, if the lawyer clearly discerns that a
proposed act is wrong, the lawyer must not do it, and also must
not be complicit in the client's doing it. The traditional doctrine
on complicity, which I find pretty persuasive, judges complicity in
terms of intention.38 If I help somebody do something wrong, and
my purpose is to facilitate the wrong act, I am just as guilty as the
person I help. If I act for some other purpose, however, the fact
that my act also facilitates another person's wrong act does not
necessarily mean that I am doing wrong. My favorite example is
the hypothetical case of the woman who comes into my office
with two black eyes and a broken arm and wants a divorce from
her husband because he beats her up. 39 I know that she is
planning to marry someone else when her divorce
comes through. Discerning her situation in the light of my
understanding of marriage, I would regard it as wrong for her to
enter a purported marriage with someone else. But, she still
needs to be free from her abusive husband, and I believe it is
right for me to help her to gain that freedom. I will not be
complicit in anything she does wrong with that freedom when
she has it.
What all this adds up to is that we can talk to each other
about right and wrong. Rightness and wrongness are discernable
qualities of proposed acts. If I say something is morally
acceptable and somebody else says it is not, one or the other of us
is mistaken. I can try to make the other person see it my way,
and he can try to make me see it his way. It may not be easy to
reach agreement, but it is easier than it would be if right and
wrong were a matter of taste like whether hamburgers taste
better with onions. It is also easier than it would be if right and
wrong were determined by the syllogistic application of general
37 See Probabilism, in THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH
1331, 1331 (F.L. Cross & E.A. Livigstone eds., 3d ed. 1997).
38 See Richard A. McCormick, Cooperation in Evil, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
CATHOLICISM 366, 366-67 (1995).
39 See ROBERT E. RODES, JR., CLASSIC PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 44-45
(2005).
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principles that some people would affirm, others deny, and still
others not understand.
There is a journalist, Randy Cohen, who does a syndicated
column called "Everyday Ethics." He addresses concrete
situations described by his readers, and gives his opinion of what
is or is not the right thing to do.40 He states general principles
occasionally, but as summaries of his individual judgments, not
as sources for them. One can disagree with his judgments, and
some readers write in to tell him so. Both he and his readers
assume that there are right answers to be discerned, and that
reflection and discussion will help with the discernment. No one
falls back on debatable principles of philosophy or theology, and
no one attributes disagreement to matters of taste.
On a global level, the practical discernment of right and
wrong played a crucial part in the development of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. When UNESCO assembled a
panel of philosophers to consider the proposed Declaration, it
emerged that there was broad agreement on what the rights
were, but no agreement at all on the source of the rights.
Maritain prefaces a book of widely divergent philosophical papers
on the subject with an explanation based on what seems
to be a more sophisticated version of his knowledge through
connaturality. 41
Lawyers need to concern themselves with moral discernment
on both these levels. They have charge of the most important
cohesive force in a pluralist society such as ours-both in our own
country and in the world. In the work entrusted to them, they
cannot rely on enacted measures devoid of moral content. Nor
can they rely on elegant syllogisms with debatable premises.
Their calling is to meticulous investigation and careful reflection
on the rights and wrongs of individual cases. It is on that work
that the peace of our society and the love of our neighbors
depend.
40 Many of his judgments are collected in RANDY COHEN, THE GOOD, THE BAD, &
THE DIFFERENCE: HOW TO TELL RIGHT FROM WRONG IN EVERYDAY SITUATIONS
(2002).
41 See Jacques Maritain, Introduction to UNESCO, HUMAN RIGHTS, COMMENTS
AND INTERPRETATIONS 9, 12-14 (1949).
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